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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah; and
BANK OF NORTHERN UTAH, an unincorporated association.
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
11900

AP·PELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for a judicial review of the actions
and proceedings of the defendant Commissioner of
F'inancial Institutions in authorizing the Bank of Northern Utah to operate a bank in Clearfield, Utah, purto the order of said Commissioner, dated March
12, 1969.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, of no cause of action.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the lower
court decision, and a determination that the def enaant
Commissioner's action in authorizing the Bank of North0rn Utah to operate a bank in Clearfield, Utah, was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law; and for a judgment an<l
order vacating and holding invalid the order of said
Commissioner wherein such authorization was granted,
enjoining defendant Bank of Northern from establishing
its bank at Clearfield, and awarding damages to plaintiff-appellant in event the Bank of Northern Utah engages in the banking business.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about September 17, 1968, the defendant, Bank
of Northern Utah, an unincorporated association, filed
its application with the defendant Commissioner to operate a bank in Clearfield, Utah. After due notice of the
filing of such application was given, protests to the
granting of such application were filed by six banking
institutions, :including plaintiff-appellant, and the State
Savings and Loan Association. Plaintiff operates a bank
at Clearfield, Utah. A public hearing was held on N ovember 26-29, 1968, and concluded on December 6, 1968. The
defendant Commissioner issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, and Order on March 12, 1969. (R. 6-10) The
plaintiff-appellant prosecuted its review of that order,
(R. 1-5) and defendants filed their answers to the complaint. (R. 14-17; R. 21-22). Determination was made
2

by tlw lower court following hearing thereon, the court

issniHg-

memorandum decision (R. 24-34) and its judg(R. ;);), 36) Appeal has been taken from the memorandum decision and the judgment (R. 37)
J

In this brief the transcript of testimony of the administratiYe hearing is referred to by the abbreviation,
"Tr.", and the exhibits, as marked in the hearing. In
the hearing the plaintiff-appellant was referred to as
the "protestant Clearfield State Bank" and the defendant Bank of Northern Utah by the designation "applicant". The parties are referred to herein by
terms as well as by the designations in the lower court.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE PROPOSED BANKING FACILITY
IS IN FACT A BRANCH BANK AND ANY
THEREOF C 0 NT RAVENES STATE LAW.
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, precludes
the establishment of a branch bank in Clearfield, Utah,
hy a state bank, inasmuch as that municipality is not
a city of the first class, and the Clearfield State Bank
1s located at Clearfield. The statute provides, in part:
''Except in cities of the first class, or within
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or town in which is located a hank or banks, state or national, regularly
transacting a customary banking business, unless
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall
take oYer an existing branch. " " " "
3

It is submitted that the proposed institution is in
fact a branch of the Bank of Utah, and that defendant
applicant has attempted by a subterfuge to circumvent
the provisions of the statute aforementioned.
The evidence at the administrative hearing in<licatf's
that the Bank of Utah has its principal office at Ogden,
Utah, and maintains branches at South Ogden, Riverdale, and Roy, Utah, all within a few miles and travel
minutes from Clearfield. (Tr. 280-282; Plaintiff protestant's Exhibit C) It is also apparent that the controlling
stock ownership of the Bank of Utah and the proposed
controlling stock ownership of the applicant are one and
the same; that is, those incorporators whose stock ownership will control the defendant Bank of Northern Utah
are also the controlling stockholders of the Bank of Utah.
(Tr. 462, 159-160)
According to 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
pages 240-241 :
"Where the corporate form of organization
is adopted or a corporate entity is asserted in an
endeavor to evade a statute as to modify its intent, courts will disregard the corporation or its
entity and look at the substance and reality of
the matter."
That a "branch" bank arises where there is common
ownership of two banking corporations is apparent from
the case of Braeburn Securities Corporation v. Smdh,
153 N.E. 2d 806, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court explained a rationale of the bank holding company act of
that state as follows:
4

" " " " Branch banking in Illinois has been
prohibited for many years.
"It is clear that this prohibition could be
1·. !'('nm vented
and indirect branch hanking result if, through ownership of bank stock, one or
more bank holding companies could control several banks. Branch banking can be accomplished
by one bank operating at several locations or by
one company owning or controlling several banks
variously located." at 809, 810.
According to the 1967 supplement to 1 1\Iichie, Banks
and Banking, Section 27:
''The corporate wil should be pierced whenever one bank is doing business through the instrumentality of another or in the same way as
if the institutions were one and, if such circumstances exist, the relationship of parent and
branch exists within federal and state statutes
prohibiting branch banks even though banks are
separate corporate organizations."
See Whituey National Bank in Jefferson Parrish
1'. Bank of Nrw Orleans and Trust Company, 323 F.
2d 290. (rev. on other grounds 379 U.S., 411)
In addition to the common control of the defendant
Bank of Northern Utah, and the Bank of Utah, a unitary
type and plan of operation is indicated from the following:

(a) 'fhe office of cashier of the Bank of Utah and
the office of cashier of the Bank of Northern Utah, are
to he held by the same person, William Beutler. (Tr.
1.i5, !l4, 72) According to 10 American Jurisprudence
2d, Banks, p. 132:
5

''The bank cashier generally has greater inherent power than any other bank officer. Ordinarily, the cashier of a hank is regarded as
its chief executive officer ... ''
It is stated in 4 Michie, Banks and Banking, pages 9fi
and 97 as follows :
''The powers and duties of a cashier, in virtue of his office, are much greater than the president's though his office is strictly executive. In
fact, the cashier generally has greater inherent
powers than any other bank officer. " " " ''
(see cases cited in the treatise, and the curreut
supplement thereto.)
It is certain that the Bank of Utah and the Bank
of Northern Utah, managed by a common cashier, will
engage in a singular operation. Although one might
initially wonder how l\Ir. Beutler can truly represent
the interests of two banking institutions whose respective fields of seeming competition overlap, there is nothing really anomolous with his role when the corporate
veil is pierced, for it is then apparent that the two institutions are doing business in the same way as if they
were one, and/or that the applicant is the instrumentality of the Bank of Utah.

(b) There are interlocking officers and directors of
the Bank of Northern Utah and Bank of Utah (Tr. 155,
156) indicative of the plan of operation, and the new
institution will be managed and controlled by the executives of the Bank of Utah.

6

( c)

Bank of Utah will in effect subsidize the

J),": k of N" ort hem U taL. The cashier of the Bank of

Utah, "William Beutler, will receive no salary
as cm;hier, hut will continue as a salaried employee and
cashier of the Bank of Utah. (Tr. 95, 96) Yet he will
devote whatever time is required to the Bank of Northern Utah, " " " " whether it was half a day, an hour a
day, or eight hours a day." (Emphasis added) (Tr. 96)
This unitary accomodation between the two banking institutions was explained by 1\fr. Beutler as follows:
;\or11H'rn

'' Q. How can you function as a cashier of the

Bank of Northern Utah without leaving the
Bank of Utah?

A. If I can liken this to a situation between the
Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond,
"Which yon have been rather interested in, you
know we ha\'e a new officer, an auditor. We
allow our auditor at the Bank of Utah to spend
certain time at the Bank of Ben Lomond for
which the Bank of Utah is compensated. Thus
this one officer ends up as an officer of each
bank. So we would expect a similar situation.
However, with this exception, we would not as
organizers of a new bank want to put undue
drain on the resources of our new child here,
our new bank. So I for one, and I can speak
only for myself, would be willing to serve the
new bank without compensation and I fully
plan to." (Tr. 95)
(d) The architecture of the proposed Bank of
Xorth<>rn Utah reflects the architecture used by the Bank
of Utah. The application indicates it will be "colonial
sty!Pd ".
Frank
Browning responded to a question

7

regarding the proposed architecture of the Bank of
Northern Utah, when authorized heretofore, as followR ·
'' Q. Mr. Browning, let me ask this, do you recall
ever making a statement that the architecture
of the new bank and the interior design would
follow the colonial architecture exemplified
in Ogden and all branch banks of the Bank of
Utah?

A. I am sure I made that statement. If a reporter
asked me that, that is the statement I would
make." (Tr. 266)
Plaintiff protestant 's Exhibit AB represents the
architect's sketch of the proposed building of the applicant. (Tr. 443) Plaintiff protestant's Exhibits AC and
AD are photographs of the Bank of Utah's branch at
Riverdale, Utah, within five miles of Clearfield. An examination of said Exhibits AB, AC, and AD reveals
that the proposed building of the applicant is virtually
identical with the Riverdale branch of the Bank of Utah,
further suggesting a solitary plan of operation.
( e) The application has been referred to as that of
a branch. Under cross examination Mr. Beutler was
asked if the Bank of Utah were to apply for a branch
at Syracuse, Utah, would it weigh the resulting impact
on the Bank of Northern Utah. The question and answer
follow:

"Q. Do you think that they would, in their consideration weigh the impact of that branch
on the Bank of Northern Utah?
A. Well, I don't know. They probably would. We
would consider it in much the same way we

8

tried to consider the impact on the other North
Davis banks in applying for this branch."
(Emphasis added) (Tr. 108)
(f) The defendant, Bank of Northern Utah, by its
application in the instant matter and in its previous applications has designated a business name which suggests
a similarity to Bank of Utah. Initially the proposed name
of the corporation was to be Central Bank of Utah (Tr.
468-±G9), but for a reason immaterial here, the proposed
name was changed to Bank of Northern Utah. In either
caRl', hy emphasis or de-emphasis, the phrases, Central
Hank of Utah, and Bank of Northern Utah, contain the
1rnnls necessary to indicate identification of the defr11dnnt applicant with the Bank of Utah.

(g) The projected operating income as set forth in
thr application was based upon the performance rate of
the Bank of Utah; it was opined that the projected opPrating expenses in the Bank of Northern Utah would
fall somewhere within the same category as those of the
Bank of Utah. (Tr. 89, 90, 99)
En•n though the applicant is a proposed corporation, claiming status as a distinct entity, its existence
and apart from the Bank of Utah cannot be
sustained. In this matter the corporate veil should be
piercrd, and the resulting exposure indicates that the
Bank of Utah and the proposed Bank of Northern Utah
will operate as if the two institutions were one, and/or
the latter as the instrumentality of the former, in contrnw·11tio11 of Utah law.
9

According to Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, a ground for refusal of approval of an application
for a banking charter is " * * " when the plan of operation does not comply with the laws of the state governing
such institution * " * '' . In this case it is submitted that
the proposed operation violates the provisions of Section
7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, as heretofore set forth.
It is further submitted that the failure of the Commisof Financial Institutions to so find, and his further failure to pierce the corporate veil, and go behind
the application and proposed articles, was arbitrary and
capnc10us.
POINT II
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF'S ELICITING PROBATIVE EVIDENCE, AND IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
AND INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT
MADE AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF.
As has been set forth in a prior point, plaintiff contends that the proposed banking institution is in fact a
branch of the Bank of Utah, and its 0stablishment i11
Clearfield, Utah, would violate Section 7-3-6, U.C.A.
1953, as amended. At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff, in attempting to elicit evidence on the issue of
whether the proposed operation constituted branch banking, was precluded from producing such evidence; ancl
during the course of the hearing defendant applicant
tendered "confidential" information on that subject to
10

thC' (
of Fin an c i a 1 Institutions, which
1w.ther of the defendants made available to the plaintiff.
It is elementary that due process requirements of

tlH· federal and state constitutions require that a hearing before an administrative agency exercising judicial,
qnasi judicial, or adjudicatory powers must be fair, open,
and impartial, and if such a hearing is denied, the administrative action is void. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative
Law, p. 222. It is also fundamental that an administrative
body may not base a decision, or findings in support
thereof, upon evidence or information, outside the record,
and in particular upon evidence obtained without the
presence of and notice to interested parties, and not
made known to them prior to the decision. Annotation,
18 A.L.R. 2d 552. A rule otherwise would amount to a
denial of a hearing. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S.
407; E11glish z:. Long Beach, (Calif.) 217 P.2d 22. See
also Spencer r. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20
P.2d 618; Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service
('0111m. et al., 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542.
1 Davis, AclministratiYe Law Treatise, p. 412, states:
"The true principle is that a party who has
a sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination of governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with
the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts, except in the rare circumstance
when some other interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding of the interest in
fair hearing. " " " ''
11

During plaintiff's examination of William W. Beutler, Vice President and Cashier of the Bank of Utah, a11<l
cashier and director of the Bank of Northern Utah, the
witness was asked the identity of the stockholders
had controlling interest of the Bank of Utah and Bank
of Ben Lomond. (Tr. 69-72) (Tr. 71, 72) The evidence
sought was to "establish that the control of the Bank of
Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond is also the controlling
interest of the applicant bank". (Tr. 70) The witness indicated the information was available. The plaintiff requested of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions
" " " " An order directing Jfr. Beutler to
furnish at this hearing the stockholders of the
Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond, or
in the alternative the stockholders of the Bank
of Utah who own 89% of the stock of the Bank
of Utah who also own 73.55% of the stock of Ben
Lomond'',
of which ownership percentages the witness had previously given testimony. (Tr. 74, 69)
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions <lenier1
the request for the order sought, concluding it was confidential information. He invited the clefc,nclant Bank of
Northern Utah
" " " " to consider informing us whether any
of the applicants in this matter or any combination of individual applicants represent a controlling interest in any other hank. I will leave it np
to them whether they furnish the information or
not but I will open the hearing for that infornrntion if they care to furnish it." (Tr. 84, 8G)

12

The plaintiff restated that the purpose of its intpti r.1· \\'as to establish that the defendant applicant was
,, hrn:1d1 of the Bank of Utah and/or Bank of Ben
Lomond, and that the evidence sought also bore upon the
question of competition and monopoly inasmuch as the
Bank of Utah ha(l branches at South Ogden, Riverdale,
a]l(l Roy, all
close mileage of Clearfield State
Bank. (Tr. 86) Plaintiff requested an order requiring
the procludion of the percentage of stock ownership that
caeh incorporator of the applicant owns of the stock of
the Bank of Utah and/or the Bank of Ben Lomond, and
also the percentage of stock that such incorporator owns
in any corporation which owns stock in the Bank of Utah
or Bank of Ben Lomond. (Tr. 87) The Commissioner
<k11iPd the request, indicating the submission of the information to be voluntary.
'' * • • I am going to not issue a formal order
that your furnish this information * * • the hearing will accept this information and testimony
on it if you care to bring it." (Tr. 88)

8uhsequently, during the hearing, voluntary submission of the percentages of stock ow'llership was given
to the Commissioner of Financial Institutions by defentla n t applicant
" • • • on the condition it was given to the
Commissioner as a confidential matter • • • "
(Tr.156)
H was not madP arnilahle to the plaintiff protestant (Tr.
l:i7), and objection to not being afforded the opporto examine the materials submitted was raised.
( '!' r . .J.61--tG2)

13

It is not only apparent from the transcript of the
hearing that evidence was tendered by the defendant
applicant and received by the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions relating to the stock interests af orementioned, and plaintiff was not allowed the opportunity to
examine the same, but the transcript of oral argument
in the trial court contains the admissions of counsel for
the Bank of Northern Utah that certain of the evidence
and information thus submitted to the Commissioner was
not made available to the counsel for the plaintiff protestant. (R. 97, 98; Oral Argument Transcript, Trial
Court)

In conclusion 5 of the defendant Commissioner'R
order he ''concludes'' of the organizers of the proposed
bank:
'' * * * Their financial responsibility is established by personal financial statements that
have been filed with the Commissioner." (R. 9)
The record of the hearing indicates no such filing.
The plaintiff submits that the "conclusion" aforementoined was unsupported by any evidence-or if such eYidence were submitted by the defendant Bank of Northern
Utah, then the receipt thereof by the Commissioner, and
not making the same available to plaintiff, is action of
an arbitrary and capricious nature.
It would seem that the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions would be interested in determining the interrelationship of the banking institutions aforementioned,
and whether the defendant applicant was or was not

14

·'''JHHate (•ntity in fact, and whether there would be a
L·"·'-'L·ning of competition in the area by reason of the
ii.t, rrelationships enumerated. It is submitted that the
('ommif"sioner should have ordered the production of
rYirlrnce regarding the relationships at issue here, and
his failure to do so, was arbitrary and capricious.
Although recignizing the law anent branch banking,
the Commissioner in his decision dismissed the issue here
pn·sented with the conclusion: '' 4. That applicant's request is to establish a unit bank, not a branch bank."
(R. 9). This cursory dismissal and the failure of the
Commissioner to pursue his own inquiry of the relationship of the defendant applicant and the Bank of Northrm Utah invokes the language of Central and Southern
Jf()for Freight Tariff Association, et al v. U.S. et al, 273
F.Rupp.823,at832:
" " " " What is disturbing is the mechanistic,
metaphysical incantation of the doctional bar of
th(l corporate veil. Such doctrines lose much of
their sacrosanctity when urged in the context of
regulated industries. The fact that a subsidiary
corporation exists should be a starting point for
a searching inquiry, not the finish line. " " " "
In all the aforementioned was the defendant CommiRsioner arbitrary and caprieious; in precluding plaintiff in the elicitation of probative evidence; in denying
the requests of plaintiff for orders compelling the pro1lnetion of prohati,·e evidence; and in the "unilateral"
reeeption of evidence submitted by defendant applicant
whieh was not made available to the plaintiff. Had the
P\'i<l<>rn'r heen made available to plaintiff, further in-

15

<1niry could have been pursued, and evidence produced,
regarding the question of branch banking, and the ri1ws.
tion of competition and monopoly. The action of the defendant Commissioner was prejudicial to plaintiff.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT APPLICANT DOES
NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE CAPITAL
AND SURPLUS.
Section 7-3-10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth
the minimum capital and surplus required to engage in
the banking business, of which at least fifty per cent of
the said capital and surplus must be paid in cash. See
Section 7-3-11, U.C.A. 1953.
The applicants represented under oath in an affidavit filed with proposed articles of incorporation that
the requisite capital and surplus had been paid in cash.
Under cross examination, an officer of the applicant
testified that the affidavit was in error, that he did not
want to mislead anybody, that nothing had been paid in,
and that no stock subscription agreement had been executed by any of the incorporators. (Tr. 76-77)
It is submitted that the proposed banking institution has failed to meet the requirements as heretofore
set forth, and that the Commissioner of Financial Institutions was arbitrary and capricious in finding to the
contrary. (See Finding of Fact, number 6, R. 6)

16

POINT IV
THE COl\Il\IISSIONER OF FINANCIAL
l\fSTITUrrIONS WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS IN ADMITTING 0 BJ E C TIONABLE EVIDENCE, AND MAK ING
FINDINGS THEREFROM, AND IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE, TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF.
Tu the presentation of its case the Bank of Northern
Ftah offered certain testimony and exhibits which were
the suhject of objection; certain of this evidence became
I he basis for findings and conclusions of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, which in turn provided
tlw hasis for the order as issued. The admission of such
1•1·idPuee was error, and the Commissioner was arbitrary
and a bused his discretion iu making findings and condusions thereon.

rr11e findings of an administrative agency must be
support<•d by substantial evidence; and the rule of sub,,ta11tial eviclence is a determinative of lawfulness or
arbitrary action. In tlH' case of Building Seri·ice Em11lo1r1's Lu('al No. 59 c. Ne1cl1011se Realty et al, 97 Utah
9:J P.2cl 507 this court held:
" * * * l\Iere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. * * "
Hearsay and non-expert opinion evidence may not
he used as a basis to support the findings of the
Board upon which rests an order sought to be
enforced. " " " ''
.11J1crica11 Fo111ulry 111111 Jla('lii11e ('o. r. Ctah Labor
(Utah) 141 P.:M 390.

1!1Tutin11s lfoarrl,

17

In his Finding of Fact 12, the Commissioner cites
the testimony of Charles J. Cuneo and Charles J. Eddy
as indicating public convenience and advantage for thP
proposed bank (R. 8) A careful reading of the testimony
of applicant's witness, Charles Cuneo, reveals that it is
replete with hearsay, and clearly objectionable. This is
especially true with respect to his testimony regarding
surveys of individuals who have moved into Clearfield,
and the industries located at the Freeport Center. The
sun'eys in question >Vere not made by the witness (Tr.
24); the surveys did not keep a record of those who
moved from Clearfield (Tr. 25); and the witness was
unable to testify as to vacated housing. (Tr. 34) The
witness claimed ten new industries had moved into Freeport, but could not name them. (Tr. 30) The source of
the information was hearsay. (Tr. 29) The witness
opined that there was need for an additional bank, sueh
judgment being based on the objectionable and defectin
"evidence" aforementioned. (Tr. 32) Cleary the CYidence elicited from Cuneo was without foundation, rank
hearsay, and of no probative value. Due objection was
made to the introduction of such testimony and evidence.
The testimony of Mr. Charles Eddy reflects a continuing bias and prejudice against this protestant and
interjection of his personal politics into the issue before
the Commissioner. He seems to be motivated also by the
potential taxes which Clearfield will realize if an additional bank is authorized in the city. (Tr. 47) The opinions of Charles Eddy indicate a complete lack of knowledge or understanding of the regulatory system of bank18

ing w the state and country, and an inability to
il i m{uish a bank from any other business.
\i ayor Eddy claimed that his opinion was that of the

city council. (Tr. 44) Certain councilmen have stated
t0 the contrary, and rightly left the decision with the
Commissioner, free of political pressure. (Plaintiff protestant 's Exhibit AE)
In his Finding of Fact 17, the Commissioner adopts
th<· testimony of William A. Beutler, an officer of the
rl1·fondant Bank of Northern Utah, regarding the projede<l deposit growth and earnings and expenses for
th(' proposed bank. (R. 8) Such a finding was unsupported, for l\Ir. Beutler newr did come up with the evick·11el' in support of his projections, upon which the
\ 'ommissioner made the "finding".
Jkutler referred to a "study" he had made which
1H· nc•ver produced, supposedly based upon reports publishe(l in the Polk Directory and published by the State
Banking Department which he never identified. (Tr. 58)
Hr did not cite figures (Tr. 60) ; he did not have them
\1ith him (Tr. 64, 65, 66); he admitted he did not do
"iml0pendent research to come up to this hearing", but
"rPlied heaYily on the work we had done for the previous
l11 ari11g ". (Tr. 80) Actually, he deferred to another ·witlll's:,; (Tr. G5, 82,), who in turn did not analyze the profitability of the proposed institution, and in turn deferred
t11 Beutler. (Tr. 204)
1
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This witlless Beutler produce<l llO evidence of a probative nature to support the projected growth of the ULfendant applicant, despite the queries of protestants, the
Commissioner, and the attorney for the Commissioner.
(Tr. 63-65)
The Commissioner in his Conelusioll 8 states in part:

" * * * The projections applicant has made
for its growth may be
optimistic, * * " "
(R. 10)
yet the Commissioner referred to such testimony in his
f inclings.
Finding of Fact 17 is not supported by substantial
evidence, is erroneous and its adoption by the Commissioner is contrary to law. Timely objection to the "testimony" of Beutler was made. (R. 59)
The <lefenclant commissioner 'ms also arbitrary and
capricious in adopting his findings of fact, numbers 9,
10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 (R. 7, 8) which infer a demand
or hasis for authorizing the proposed banking operation.
It appears that the <lefendant Commissioner followed
the approach and argument of Milton Matthews, a witness for the Bank of Northern Utah, 'vho had prepared
a so-called economic analysis, <lef endant applicant's Exhihit 1. Actually, the role of Mr. l\Iatthews was one of
an advocate, as his active participation would indicate.
(Tr. 250) His exhibit and testimony were in the nature of
argument, being prepared to support a conclusion already asserted by the defendant bank in its applic-a ti on,
and prior to the preparation of the study. l\[ilton
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.\[;, t t li<'ws admitted he was not an expert in the field
: ,;111 ki11g-, and had never worked in a bank anylien· in t lw sta tc of l: tah. (Tr. 165, 166) He in no way
uualyzed the profitability of the proposed institution, or
its effect on the deposits of the existing institutions.
('J'r. 204) His presentation was based almost entirely
011 hParsay material, and not being qualified as an expert, was incapable of analyzing the significance of the
material as it bore upon the question of public need of
a hank, if any. (Tr. 274-275)
,,;
11

Vi11ding of fact, number 11 (R. 8, 9) and Conclusion
10), as promulgated by the defendant Commissioner refor to certain population figures as adopted
h)· th<' defendant Commissioner, and a ratio of banking offin•s to population. The Commissioner's action
is erroneous in that he has adopted the Matthe,.vs
popnlatio11 estimates which partake of inherent deficien"ies . .'.\latthews used Davis County authorized building
JH rmits as the criteria for estimating population after
1%0, ,,·ith an arbitrary allocation on a local area basis.
( St>l' defl•ndant applicant's Exhibit 1) Therefore, his
population figures did not consider any demolition or
racancies occurring during the same period. (Tr. 170)
This is most significant in Clearfield, where there has
l1<'e11 a reduction of over 235 dwelling units at Anchorage
llonsi11g since 1960, aml relocation of Clearfield reside11ts (Tr. 327). The attempt by .'.\Iatthews to cover over
this lld'iciency was unsuccessful, and typical of other
inaeC'uracies. (Tr. 170) The defendant Commissioner perpl'i uatcd this l'ITor throughout his findings.
(i ( H.
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The defendant Commissioner's findings and con.
clusions relating to the population comparisons require
the arbitrary allocation of a potential clientele to a trading area which does not exist in fact, and amounts to an
economic gerrymander. For example, Finding of fact
number 11 purports to total and compare population of
certain cities in North Davis County, and analyzes th('
banking facilities therein. The area thus carved out for
comparison swings south sen'n miles from Clearfield to
Kaysville (Tr. 285), but dramatcially halts short of the
Weber County line at the north and fails to include Roy,
within 3 miles of Clearfield, and Riverdale, within 3
miles, (Tr. 285) Sec Point VI, infra. In comparing ratio,of banking facilities to population of DaYis County, thr·
Commissioner includes the South Davis areas which are
far more remote than South ·wcber banking offices and
population.
The approach of the defendant Commissioner, and
defendant applicant, seem to presuppose some owrsimplified mathematical formula: X number of people=
a bank. Obviously, this arbitrary method fails to consider
factors which should be taken into consideration in such
a determination. The findings of the Commissioner include the reasoning and premise that somehow the population per banking facility determined on a state basis
is the criteria for determining the necessity or requirement of a local bank. This averaging process, of necessity, lumps unit hanks and branch offices, the
such as those at Richmond, Eureka, and Green River,
supported by small rural populations, with main bank
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dtu·e,; at Salt Lake City. Any valid analysis of existing
1i<1nk i. ·g- facilities requires at least a recognition and apprnpria te differentiation of unit and branch banks.
(Plai11tiff protestant's Exhibit G; Tr. 317)
Furthermore, the "population approach" of the defrndants engages in dangerous circular reasoning for the
mon• hanking institutions in the state, the lower the
population per banking facility, which average if applied
to a g-i,·en area with a higher population per facility,
'·' ould result in a grant of a new facility; this in turn
l1>1n•rs the average population per facility in the state
relp1iring more banks, ad infinitum. The fallacy of this
ap1Jroach is evident-for, in truth, increasing the banking- facilities cannot result in the requirement of more
I1ai1king facilities.
It is submitted that the Commissioner's equating

hauking needs solely with population is arbitrary; how1•n:'r if the approach is deemed reasonable it should con·'i1k•r adult population and not the general population.
ln this regard the plaintiff protestant offered an analy-;is of banking facilities per population of 18 years and
oldC'r, which in itself includes ages which do not normally
g(•11erate hanking demands. Even with such concession,
plaintiff protestant 's Exhibit Y shows:
1967 Population 18 and
over per hanking facility
5,902
5,050
3,942
3,743
3,723

Location
rtah County
Weber County
Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Dm·is County
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It is evident that Davis County haR more hm:b. fH
population 18 and over than any of the more populated
areas in the state.
It is also apparent that a comparison of the general
population per unit bank, for the state and the populated
counties, indicates that Davis County haR a lower population (13,571) per unit bank than Weber (26,200), Utah
(21,166) or Salt Lake Counties (33,000), or the State of
Utah (19,145). (Plaintiff protcstant's Exhibit AF)

In adopting his findings the defendant Commissioner also arbitrarily ignored the existence of State
Sa,·ings and Loan Association, located at Clearfield,
Utah (Tr. 282, 467), the only savings and loan i1rntitution in North DaviR County, in his population arnJ ratio
comparisons.
It is further submitted that the defendant Commissioner based his findings and conclusions on hearsay and
other clearly ohjectionable evidence; and that in so doing
also he was arbitrary and abused his discretion in that
in accepting such "evidence" he disregarded other competent and convincing evidence. See Building Sercice
Employees Local No. 59 v. Newhouse Realty Co. et al,
supra. Thus in accepting certain population informatio11
of defendant applicant, the defendant Commissioner
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tot a !,y disregarded the population characteristics and
geography of the area, which bear directly on
the issue of probable support of the proposed existing
institution. See Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
Tlie record clearly indicates that Clearfield, Utah, is
limited i11 its population potential and economic developme11t hy reason of its present geographical and political
houmlaries. (Tr. 278-289; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits
B, l'.) The city is "hemmed in" by Hill Field on the
1·nst; Layton City on the south; Syracuse on the west;
aml Sunset City on the north. Clearfield is internally
dissected by the Interstate Freeway 15; the trackage of
t\rn major railroads; the Freeport Center; and public
within its boundaries. All of these factors have
ri:strided the growth of Clearfield, and left only a limit1•d amount of acreage for residential construction, which
arnilahle acreage is of questionable desirability (Tr.
nR-289, 388; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits B, C.)
TIH'se limitations and restrictions have resulted in a substa11tial decline in residential construction and other den'lopment in Clearfield during the most recent years in
<·ontrast to surrounding areas, such as Layton and Kays\·ille (Tr. 383; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibit W.) It
woultl seem that if any real growth were going to occur
it "hould have been in the most recent years--but no such
iuerease has take11 placP in Cl0arficl<l.
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The defendant Commissioner also ignored the low
median age of the Davis County population in
with surrounding counties in the state. The percentages
of the population under 18 years of age for the most
populated counties and the state are as follows: Davis
County 47.5; W cber County 37.2; Salt Lake County 38.7;
Utah County 37.9; State of Utah :-!9.3. (Plaintiff protestant's Exhibit X) It is apparent that the population
of Davis County and Clearfield indicate a higher percentage of infants, and a lower demand for bauking
than the population of other areas comprised of a higher
percentage of adults and their resulting needs arising
from commercial transactions.
Also ignored was the uncontroverted e\·idence that
the Clearfield population is hea,·ily dependant upon
federal government employment, especially Hill Air
Force Base. Approximately 70 per cent of the employed
persons in Clearfield arc employed by the federal go\·ernment (Tr. 309) which employment lends itself to a
more transcient population. Being so heavily dependent
upon Hill Air Force Base, the economy of Clearfield
suffers, and has suffered, severe adverse consequences
with cutbacks at the military installation, and real and
potential reductions are continuing problems because of
political decisions, peace negotiations, congressional appropriations, and changes in the military posture. The
decreases aud potential cutback in this employment wNr
predicted by Frank M. Browning, 01w of the principab
im·olnd in the application, in testimony before the Com-

26

rn au earlier hearing. (See plaintiff Protest·1H! 's ; \:hibit A)
0

Tli0 defendant Commissioner also disregarded the
"om·incing e'.'idence that the trading patterns of the
l'learfiPld population indicate an orientation toward
Ogdr11 as a major point for the purchase of goods. (Tr.
:3G8, :377, 395), borne out by per capita sales and services
fa\. rnllection companions (Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits?\, 0, P), and development of areas outside ClearfiPkl. ('l'r. 445, 449)
The adual demands of Davis County residents for
in the immediate areas are for less than other
commnnities of the state, as indicated by the per capita
l1a11k rPsources, deposits allCl loans in Davis County as
c·ompan•cl to the state as a whole, revealing Davis County
i;-; far helow the state aYerage, and its rate of increase
11ot eommensura te with the population increase. (Plaint if±" Protestant's Exhibit U)
It is submitted that the defendant Commissioner
11·as arbitrary and capricious, and abused his discretion,
in rlisrPg"a rding the aforementioned evidence, and ac('l']Jting- only part of the eYidence presented, and that of
11m•stionable competency. It is also submitted that the
finding-:-; and c0Hclusio11s adopted by the Commissioner
an• not true findings and conclusions, not only as to
I orm, hut also 110t hased on substantial evidence.
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POINT V
THE PROPOSED LOCATION OF
FENDANT APPLICANT AND Irrs FIF}LD
OF OPERATION ARE IN SUCH CLOSE
PROXIMITY TO THE C L E A RF I E L D
STATE BANK AS TO UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WirrH SAID BANK, AND
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT APPLICANT
AND PLAINTIFF SUCH AS TO 1\fAKE IMPROBABLE THEIR SUCCESS.
Tlw statutory pro,·isions of Seetion 7-1-26 U.C.A.
1953, as amende(l, make as a con<litio11 for denial of an
application.
" * * * \\·hen the location or fi0ld of op0ratio11
of the proposed business shall lw in such close
proximity to an established business subject to
this title that such established business might be
unreasonably interferred with and the support
of the new business would he such as to make irnproba hle its success" " " ".
It is contended that the eYidence submitted in the
administrative hearing indicates the foregoing statutory
condition to exist. The application in que;;tion is unlike
the situation where an applicant seeks to estahfo;]i a
hanking site more co11\'enient to a local area; th0 defcudant applicant in effect offers no new advantage of
greater convenience, hut duplicates facilities to cfo·ide
the present business. In his conclusion G, the Commissioner conclwles that the "field of opNation of the proposed bank will not be in such close' proximity to all
Pxisting husint>ss as to mircasm1ahly i11tPrcforp with it.''
(R.
Howcwr, i11 his Fimling of Fad, numlwr 10, the
Commissioner states:
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* * * Clearfirld State Bank depends upon
trading area that would be served by the
applicant for its primary source of business;
* * * " (R. 7)
t lic-

"

Adually the trading area of defendant applicant is
literally identical with that of the plaintiff. Also, the
Hidence rPvrals that the defrndant applicant has not
dPtcrmine<l anything sprcifically respecting its proposed
hank site (Tr. 78) and that no lease agreement had been
<•x(•rutPcl (Tr. 150) It is therefore submitted that the
d<·fendant Commissioner had no substantial basis to
n•1wli the conclusion aforementioned.
F11rtl1Nmore, the order of the defendant Commissiom•r sets forth no specific location for the proposed
l 1a11ki ng operation. Irnleed, the order is a cart a blanche
<Is far as the' location in C'learfirld is concerned, pro\ idi11g:
"That the application of Bank of Northern
a proposed Utah corporation, for permission to establish a unit hank in Clearfield, Davis
County, Utah, is hereby approved, subject to the
condition that it qualify for and obtain insurance
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
lwforp it commences operation" (R. 10)
The actual site of any proposed bank is a critical
l'i<'Ill('llt in <1Ptermini11g the question of the location and
t'ic>ld of opc•ration of said hank and any unreasonable inh·rfrrenc·e with an existing institution. How can the admi11istrntin• officL'l' make such a determination "·hen the
'itc• is uncertain! Aml how can thr existing institution
IH· protc•d<>d against m1n•aso11alilr interference unless
<111 (1pc•rntion is restrictr<l to a sprcific site? It is sub-
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mitted that the defendant Commissioner's action in this
respect is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.
The success of plaintiff is further in jeopardy for
the reason that an authorized branch of the First National Bank of Layton, at Syracuse Road on the Clearfield
border, will divert customers of the Clearfield State
Bank, since that branch is located nearer to one-third
of the Clearfield population than the office of plaintiff.
(Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits B, C.) There is alread1
in existence the branch of the First Security Bank of
Utah N.A., at Hill Field, subjecting the plaintiff to
direct interference. (Tr. 280) The Commissioner gaw
no indication that he weighed the effect of two additional
banking institutions on the plaintiff.
Another area of unreasonable intereference IS the
restriction that will result on the growth of the Clearfield State Bank and the denial to that institution of the
acquisition of electronic devices and computers, presently
used in the industry by larger institutions. (Tr. 312-31B)
A small independent bank, such as the Clearfield State
Bank, cannot at present afford to acquire sophisticated
electronic hanking devices, and necessary technical personnel; if the growth of plaintiff is delayed or halted, thr
bank will not be able to secure the cleviees and render thl'
service which attends their use, and will be adversely
affected by the competition from those banking institutions ·which have this electronic banking mechanisms
(Tr. 312-313.) No where is there indication that the Commissioner regarded this evidence in his decision.
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POINT VI
DEFENDANT APPLICANT HAS NOT
PRG\,TED A DEMAND FOR THE PROPOS1;;D SERVICES.
It is submitted that Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, requires inter alia, as a condition for granting
an application to operate a bank, that the applicant prove
a public demand for the proposed services, and that this
sho\Ying he tantamount to proving public convenience
and advantage.

No substantial evidence indicates a demand or need
for the proposed service; nor was any evidence produced
claiming the needs of the Clearfield residents are other\rise tha11 adequately and fully served by existing banks
and institutions.
Hereinafter set forth are the locations of banks and
loan institutions, all competitive, and the mileages of
the Rame from the business center of Clearfield:
Clearfield
Clearfield State Bank
State Savings and Loan Association
2 Mile Radius
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A.,
Hill Field
Authorized Branch, First National Bank of
Layton, (Syracuse Road) on Clearfield,
Layton boundary
Branch, Clearfield State Bank, Sunset

:n

2-3 Mile Radius
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Roy
Branch, Bank of Utah, Roy
3-5 Mile Radius
Branch, First National Bank of Layton, Layton
(Fort Lane Shopping Center)
First National Bank of Layton, Layton
North Davis Bank, Layton
Branch, Bank of Utah, Riverdale
5-6 :Mile Radius
Branch, Commercial Security Bank, "\Vashington
Terrace
6-7 Mile Radius
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., South
Ogden
Branch, Commercial Security Bank, South Ogden
Branch, Bank of Utah, South Ogden
Barnes Banking Company, Kaysville
(Tr. 278-283; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibit C)
Of the aforementioned hanking facilities, three arP
owned by the principals here involved, which facilitie,;
can be reached by Clearfield residents within a fe11
minutes time. Also existent in the• area arc other foiancial institutions, including thr especially compctitivl'
Federal Employees Credit U 11ion (Tr. 300-:30:1), serYing
employees of the federal government and their families.
There is indication that the drfcnclant Commii,;sioncr dis32

the existence of certain of the foregoing in,-t/utioli'. by reason of his arbitrary analysis of the in-;titutions in relation to population, and in failing to
Jetf'rmine the competitive effect of the foregoing institutions, and the consequences of the proposed institution
doing business at Clearfield; and the fact that the banking requirements of the Clearfield residents are being
full)' and adequately met.
reg-;11'<lr·d

CONCLUSION
Bv reason of the foregoing, the decision of the lower
('ourt should be reversed, and a judgment entered or
direck<l, granting plaintiff the relief sought for in its
complaint, including the setting aside of the Order of
tlH' Commissioner of Financial Institutions which has
authorized the banking operation at issue by defendant
Bank of
Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYl\IOND W. GEE
-100 ExecutiYe Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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